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THE LATEST CHAPTER OF THE AMERICAN LAW
OF PRIZE AND CAPTURE.
With the distribution of a small prize fund in the case
of Charles H. Davis, Captain, U. S. N., et al. v. The Paz,
Ventura and other vessels and properry, under a decree
of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, entered
April 24, 1905, the law of naval prize in the United States
became a purely historical and academic subject. That
decree was the last to be entered in regard to property
captured by the American naval forces in the Spanish
war, and Section 13 of the Act of March 3, 1899,' had
repealed "all provisions of law authorizing the distribu-
tion among captors of the whole or any portion of the pro-
ceeds of vessels, or any property hereafter captured, con-
demned as prize, or providing for the payment of bounty
for the sinking or destruction of vessels of the enemy
hereafter occurring in time of war." Hereafter, in what-
ever wars the United States may be engaged, the property
of the enemy's government and of its citizens may be
subject to capture, but the captors will have no personal
interest in such capture as long as the law remains as it
is to-day. Theoretically speaking, of course, Congress
may at any time restore the old prize system, but such
action on its part is most improbable. With the advance
of civilization, war has gradually been losing its predatory
character, and the abolition of prize rights is but one of
many steps in that advance. It naturally follows the
abandonment of privateering (a practice which, though
recognized by the Constitution, will presumably never
again be permitted under the American flag), and it will
probably lead in time to the immunity of all private
property from capture on the high seas, except for
breach of blockade or in the case of goods contraband of
war.
1 30 Stats., 1004, 1007.
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While the Act of 1899 narrows somewhat the field of
future legal proceedings in cases of capture, it does not
put an end to them, and hence it may not be wholly a
waste of time to consider the additions which the Spanish
war made to the case law on this subject, as well as to
contrast the advanced position of the United States, in
abolishing the prize rights of captors, with that of England,
content, as regards this matter, with "the good old rule,
the simple plan." Moreover, as the rights of private
property on the seas, and the rules of blockade and con-
traband, will be among the matters discussed at the next
Hague Conference, it is evident that the subject still pre-
sents many points of general interest.
Some of the Spanish war cases concerned the law of
prize in the strict sense of the term, while others concerned
the law of capture generally, and the value of the latter
as precedents is of course entirely unaffected by the aboli-
tion of the prize rights of captors.
Of the former, the prize cases pure and simple, the
most important were those in which the scope of the prize
law was involved. From i8oo until 1864 the prize law
was concerned only with "ships and vessels and the goods
taken on board of them,"'2 but the language of the Act of
June 30, 1864, Section 33,- afterwards reinacted as Section
4613 of the Revised Statutes, was less precise, and the
words, "the provisions of this title shall apply to all cap-
tures made as prize by authority of the United States,"
were sure, sooner or later, to call for some definition.
After June 30, 1864, there was so little Confederate prop-
erty left for the United States Navy to capture, that
no case then occurred in which a definition was required,
but the victory of Manila Bay supplied the necessary
grist for the judicial mill.
Inasmuch as, prior to 1864, the prize law of the United
States, unlike that of England, had never made any pro-
vision for captures on land, there was some reason for
2 Act of April 23, i8oo, Section 5, (2 Stats. 52); Act of July 17, 1862,
Section 2, (12 Stats. 6oo).
3 13 Stats., 315.
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supposing that Congress had not intended, merely by
failing to use the precise language of theearlier statutes,
to change the policy that had prevailed from the days of
the Revolution; and hence the latest edition of Halleck's
International Law contained the positive statement that
"property captured on land by a naval force of the United
States is not a 'maritime prize' even though it may have
been a proper subject of capture generally."' In The
Manila Prize Cases,5 however, it was held that the stores
and supplies of the Spanish naval establishment were
the subject of maritime prize, even though captured on
land in a naval arsenal, and this decision was necessarily
followed in the case of some coal, kept by the Spanish
Government for the use of its vessels and captured at
Ponce, Porto Rico.' The Manila Prize Cases did not hold
that all property captured on land by a naval force was
prize, but only. naval stores and supplies, and hence the
ultimate decree of condemnation, confirming the audi-
tor's report, uniformly excluded from consideration not
merely the actual plant of the arsenal itself, erected and
in use, but also all supplies, and material which were ob-
viously intended for use in or about the arsenal, as oc-
casion might require, and were not such as would regularly
be provided for use on board ship or for the construction
and repair of ships.
It was also held that the status of an enemy's vessel
of war, as sunk or otherwise destroyed within the meaning
of Section 4635 of the Revised Statutes, was not necessarily
determined by her condition at the close of the battle or
immediately afterwards, but that if some time later a
sunken vessel was raised, reconstructed and refitted, so
as to be again available as a vessel, she was to be re-
garded as a prize, and not as the subject of bounty under
Section 4635.7 The mere raising of a sunken vessel of war,
42 Baker's Halleck's Internat. Law, 81.
5 188 U.S., 254.6 Davis v. The Paz, S. C. of Dist, Col., 1905, not reported.
7 The Manila Prize Cases, 188 U. S,, 254. During the Civil war the
Albemarle, sunk by Lieut. Cushing and afterwards raised, was con-
demned as a prize, no question being raised as to her status.
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however, did not change her status, and it was necessary
to bring her safely to some port where she could be com-
pletely repaired and refitted. Until that was done the
act of the Government in having such a vessel raised and
floated, and in attempting to bring her to such a port,
was merely the act of a salvor, and was not an appropria-
tion of prize property, so that when such a vessel was
wrecked before reaching such a port, no prize money
was due for her capture, but only bounty for her destruc-
tion.8
The words "ship or vessel of war belonging to an enemy,"
as employed in Section 4635, were held to cover armament,
outfit, and appurtenances, including provisions, money to
pay the crew or for necessary expenditures, and every-
thing to be used for the purposes of the vessel as a vessel
of war; and hence it followed that when such a vessel
was "sunk or otherwise destroyed," such property,
if removed from it, would not be the subject of prize,
but could all be appropriated by the Government without
accountability to the captors.9
As already stated, the prize law applied to "all captures
made as prize by authority of the United States,," but
it had been settled law in England that there could
be no prize money unless the authority given by the
Crown to take prizes not only covered the capture but
continued unrevoked during every step that should be
taken in regard to the property until condemnation, so
that if, prior to condemnation, the Crown should restore
the property or order its restoration, the captors' authority
over it was at an end. It was therefore held that where
certain captured property had been appropriated to the use
of the United States, but the treaty of peace provided that
it should remain the property of Spain, all the captors'
prize rights in such property ceased on the exchange of
ratifications of the treaty, and the Government was no
longer responsible to the captors for the value of such
s The Infanta Maria Teresa, i88 U. S., 283.
9 The Infanta Maria Teresa, 188 U. S., 283; The Manila Prize
Cases, id. 254, 267.
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property, although it would have been so liable had it
not bound itself to restore it. 0
Under the British Statutes, in the case of captures
made by a conjoint expedition (i. e., a naval and a military
force actively co6perating in the prosecution of a common
purpose, such as the capture of a seaport town or fortress),
the prize money was divided between the two forces," but
as the American prize law contained no reference whatever
to the army's participation in any captures, it had been
held in 1872 that where the army's co6peration had aided
in bringing about the capture, no prize rights could attach,
even though the captured vessel was actually taken pos-
session of by the naval force alone.' The expedition to
Porto Rico was undoubtedly conjoint, but it was held
that where a portion of the naval force was sent ahead
to reconnoitre and prepare for the disembarkation of
the land. forces, so that the latter had no part whatever
in bringing about the captures, which were made by the
former exclusively, the mere fact that the expedition as
a whole was a joint one would not prevent property so
captured from being condemned as prize.'
As to the right to share the prize money, vessels more
than five miles away from those actually making the cap-
ture were held not to be within signal distance, and hence
not entitled to participate." Colliers, not intended to
act aggressively, and armed merely for the purpose of
their own defence, were also excluded from participation. 5
As to the relative strength of the capturing force and
the enemy (a matter of inportance in the distribution
of the fund, the captors, if of superior force, being only
entitled to one half), it was held that the statute contem-
plated a comparison of naval force only, and that land
batteries could not be taken into account, 6 and a similar
10 The Manila Prize Cases, 188 U. S., 254, 278.
1 Booty in the Peninsula, x Haggard, 47.
12 The Siren, 13 Wall., 389.
"3 Davis v. The Paz, S. C. of Dist. Col., x9o5, not reported.
" The Mangrove Prize Money, x88 U. S., 720.
15 The Manila Prize Cases, 188 U. S., 254, 283.
16 The Manila Prize Cases, 188 U. S., 254.
542 THE LATEST CHAPTER OF THE AMERICAN LAW
view was taken in the analogous case of claims for bounty
for the destruction of the enemy's vessels of war." In
estimating relative strength, it was held that the armament
of the captured vessel should be considered, rather than
the use actually made of such armament. 8
As already stated, the Spanish war gave occasion for
several decisions of more permanent importance, in that
they concerned the law of capture, as distinguished from
prize. Following the approved modern custom the
President's proclamation accorded very liberal treatment
to Spanish merchant vessels in American ports when the
war broke out, as well as to such as had sailed for Ameri-
can ports before that event, except, of course, vessels
carrying. Spanish official despatches, or military or naval
officers or any contraband goods.. The former vessels
were allowed a month, from the outbreak of the war,
for loading their cargoes and departing, while the latter
could enter, discharge their cargoes and depart, and in
both cases there was complete exemption from capture
until after such vessels had reached a Spanish or neutral
port. " Under this proclamation it was held that a
Spanish merchant vessel which had left an American port
shortly before the war broke out, was entitled to continue
its voyage without molestation, its case coming clearly
within the intention of the proclamation, so that the
capture of such a vessel was unauthorized and the decrees
of condemnation should be reversed. Peckham, J.,
said:
It is true the proclamation did not in so many words provide that
vessels which had loaded in a port of the United States and sailed
therefrom before the commencement of the war should be entitled to
continue their voyage, but we think that those vessels are clearly with-
in the intention of the proclamation under the liberal construction
we are bound to give to that document.
An intention to include vessels of this class in the exemption from
capture seems to us a necessary consequence of the language used in
the proclamation when interpreted according to the known views
of this Government on the subject and which it is to be presumed were
the views of the Executive. The vessel when captured had violated
1
7 Dewey v. United States, 178 U. S. 5io.
"I The Mangrove Prize Money, x88 U. S., 720.
19 Proclamation of April 26, 1898, 30 Stats., X770.
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no law, she had sailed from Ship Island after having obtained written
permission in accordance with the laws of the United States, to proceed
to Norfolk in Virginia, and the permission had been signed by the
deputy collector of the port and the fees therefor paid by the ship.
She had a cargo of lumber, loaded but a short time before the com-
mencement of the war, and she left the port but forty-eight hours
prior to that event. The language of the proclamation certainly
does not preclude the exemption of this vessel, and it is not an unnat-
ural or forced construction of the fourth clause to say that it includes
this case.n
The proclamation did not, however, extend any protec-
tion to a Spanish vessel on its way from one Spanish port
to another, even though it was under contract to proceed
ultimately to a port of the United States,' nor to a mail
steamer belonging to the Spanish naval reserve, though
sailing from a port of the United States.'
While the proclamation made no reference to fishing
vessels, it was held to be a rule of international law,
established by the general consent of the civilized nations
of the world, that unarmed coast fishing vessels, whose
crews were honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of
catching and bringing in fresh fish, were, with their car-
goes, exempt from capture. The opinion in this case,"
by the late Mr. Justice Gray, is extremely interesting, and
contains an elaborate historical sketch of the treatment
of fishermen in time of war for very nearly five hundred
years, showing conclusively that while their vessels were
sometimes captured, such captures were exceptional and
contrary to the prevailing humane custom of exempting
fishermen from capture, a custom which American naval
commanders had themselves followed during the Mexi-
can war.
A further application of the same doctrine was made
in the case of certain cascoes, or small native boats, and
also some floating derricks or wrecking boats, all belong-
ing to private citizens. The former vessels were of from
thirty to sixty tons capacity, propelled by sweeps and by
poling, and neither they nor the wrecking boats were in
20 The Buena Ventura, 1: U- S., 384, 39r.
21 The Pedro, 'S U. S., 3 The Guido, id. 382.
22 The Panama, 176 U. S., 535.
2
3 The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S., 677.
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any sense seagoing vessels, nor available for use except
in comparatively smooth water. It was accordingly
held that they were not subject to condemnation 4 .
As regards nationality, a case arose where a Spanish
vessel engaged in trading between Cuba and Jamaica
had been transferred by bill of sale, some time after the
war broke out, to a British subject, and had been registered
as British in the port of Kingston, Jamaica. From the
various circumstances of the case, it was concluded that
the transfer was merely colorable, and that she had been
properly captured as an enemy's vessel.' In the same
case it was contended that even if the transfer was ineffect-
ual, yet the vessel should not be condemned, because the
owner was a Cuban and sympathized with the insurrec-
tion, but it was held that in war the citizens or subjects
of the belligerents are enemies to each other without
regard to individual sentiments or dispositions, and that
political status determines the question of enemy owner-
ship. In another case it was held that the cargo of an
enemy's vessel was pre§umed to belong also to the enemy.
unless the contrary were clearly proved. 8
During the Spanish war a number of neutral vessels
were captured on account of real or supposed violation
of blockade, and the importance of the decisions rendered
in these cases, as precedents in regard to the right of cap-
ture, was not directly affected by the abolition of prize
rights. Still it is possible that some captures were made
which might not have been made had the hope of prize
money not furnished a motive, and in any future war
both courts and commanders of vessels may very prob-
ably take more liberal views of the rights of neutrals. As
was said in a dissenting opinion:
This is no time, in the history of international law, for the courts
of the United States, in laying down rules to affect the rights of neutrals
engaged in lawful commerce, to extend and apply harsh decisions made
a hundred years ago, in the stress of the bitter wars then prevailing,
when the rights of the comparatively feeble neutral states were wholly
24The Manila Prize Cases, 188 U. S., 254, 279.
2The Benito Estenger, x67 U. S., 568.
26The Carlos F. Roses, 177 U. S., 655.
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disregarded., Still less should our courts, as it seems to me was done
in this case by the District Court, adopt strained and unnatural con-
structions of facts and circumstances, in order to subject vessels of
nations with whom we are at peace to seizure and condemnation.n
The majority of the court did not hold this view, but
it is one in which very many judges, as well as a large
part of the public, are probably disposed to concur.
The case was certainly a peculiar one. The vessel was
British, but was chartered by a Cuban for the purpose
of bringing Cuban refugees to Jamaica, and the ship's
agent at Kingston had instructed the captain-to stop
immediately if signalled by any vessel of the blockading
fleet, to inform the commanding officer of the object of
the voyage, and, upon arrival in a Cuban port, not to
make any observations or sketches, nor to allow any pro-
visions to be landed, or do anything which could be in-
terpreted as a breach of faith on being allowed to pass
the blockade. On approaching Guantanamo, the vessel
was stopped by the U. S. S. Vixelz, but allowed to proceed,
whereupon she entered the bay and came to anchor, and
was then seized as prize by the Marblehead. The court
admitted that the vessel's mission was not unfriendly,
but held that as she was not a cartel ship, privileged from
capture, but was employed in a commercial enterprise,
primarily for profit, and only secondarily for the purpose
of humanity, her attempt to pass the blockade was un-
lawful, and hence that she was properly captured.
In this instance the Supreme Court undoubtedly took
a rather technical stand, and hardly seems to have dis-
played the same liberal spirit that was shown in the
fishing-smack cases. The non-technical side of the story
was told some years later by Mr. Everett P. Wheeler, the
claimant's counsel, and deserves to be given here:
All experience shows that the object of war can best be accomplished
on land by defeating and capturing, ifpossible, the enemies' armies,
and on the sea by overwhelming his fleet. A recent instance that
occurred during the Spanish war will illustrate, perhaps better than
any argument, the truth of my proposition. The American forces
besieged Santiago. Not only at sea did our fleet blockade it, but the
city was beleaguered from land, and the American forces had already
IT The Aduia, 176 U. S., 36t , 39&
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taken the neighboring port of Guantanamo. The American com-
mander had given notice to the inhabitants to leave the city of San-
tiago, because a bombardment was intended. There were at that
period in Santiago more than one thousand persons who were not
Spanish citizens. Among them was the British consul, one of the best
and noblest of men, who did more, let me say, for American citizens
in Cuba than any American resident ever did. He was there, and his
wife and children were there. There were many non-combatants, men,
women, and children, people of wealth, who had everything but the
necessaries of life, and the American troops had given them, in effect,
orders to leave the city. A British ship-owner in Jamaica, which is
only a few hours distant, sought to take advantage of this opportunity
to furnish these non-combatants with the means of escape to that
neighboring friendly island. His vessel started from Jamaica, went
to the port of Guantanamo, and asked permission to go to Santiago
and to take away those non-combatants. The naval commander should
have said: "Go, by all means, to Santiago and take them away. Our
troops have given them notice to go, and we want them away. We
have neither food nor shelter for them, and for God's sake take them."
That is what he would have done if he had had an eye single to the
success of the military operations against Santiago. But, on the other
hand, the law held up before him the opportunity to add to his prize
money. So he took possession of the vessel, as the Supreme Court
held (four judges dissenting) he had the legal right to do. He sent it
to Savannah, and one thousand neutrals were left at Santiago. In
the hot July sun they wandered, some of them *ith infants in their
arms, some women in feeble health, with feet torn and bleeding, to
the American camp. What could we do with them? We had hardly
provisions for our troops. They were on short rations. Many of
these neutrals lost their lives on account of the unavoidabie failure
of our army to care for them. Yet, in the harbor of Guantanamo,
only fifteen miles distant, was a British vessel with an owner anxious
to take them away, but the prize law was such that this offer, I will
not say kindly (although it was a kindly and friendly offer), but this
helpful offer to our military expedition was not accepted. You
can study the history of the world in its military and in its naval oper-
ations and you wiil find that the law of plunder, the law of loot, is an
obstacle to the effectiveness of all military or naval operations."
The use of steam and of long-range guns has necessarily
changed the conditions of blockading from what they
were in Lord Stowell's days, and it is now held that if a
single modem cruiser, blockading a port, renders it in
fact dangerous for other craft to enter, that is sufficient
to make the blockade effective.' The intention to violate
a blockade must be clear,' to warrant condemnation,
although if the actions of a vessel raise doubts and sus-
picions, so as to indicate a probable intention to vio-
28Report of the Universal Congress of Lawyers and Jurists, 1904, pp.
248-250.
2 The Olinde Rodrigues, 174 U. S. 51o, 518.
30 Ibid.
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late, capture will be justified, and no damages or costs
will be allowed even though restoration be decreed.3
The sailing of a vessel with a premeditated intention to
violate a blockade, is ipso facto a violation, and renders
her subject to capture from the moment she leaves the
port of departure.'
While provisions are not, in general, contraband of
war, yet they may become so, even though neutral prop-
erty, if destined for military use; and in reaching the
conclusion that they are so destined, the fact that they
are found on board a vessel engaged in trading with the
enemy, especially in supplies necessary for the enemy's
forces, is of well nigh decisive importance.'
Where restoration was decreed, it was held that even
when damages ought to be awarded, they should be merely
compensatory, not punitive, and that they should be paid
by the Government, not by the individual captors. The
Government had filed the libel and had never ordered a
release, as it might have done, had it disapproved the
capture.?
The abolition of prize and bounty in the United States
Navy, by the Act of March 3, i899, already referred to,
was a very serious violation of old traditions. It was
easy to condemn the practice as "legalized piracy" and
as demoralizing to officers and men, but there can be lit-
tle doubt that the opinion of the Navy at large was accu-
rately voiced by the officer who said that he had rather
get a hundred dollars in prize money than a thousand
dollars made in any honest way. In the British Navy
this ultra-conservative sentiment is at least as strong,
and probably more influential, for in England there is
certainly no indication as yet of any intention to follow
the example of the United States in abolishing prize. If
our recent decisions in regard to prize are destined to
be hereafter of only historical importance at home, they
3 1 The Newfoundland, 176 U. S., 97.
32 The Adula, 176 U. S., 362.
3 The Benito Estenger, 176 U. S., 568, 573.
3 The Paquete Habana, x89 U. S., 453.
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may possibly be of use in British prize courts in some
future war.
The present British prize statutes are the Naval Prize
Act, 1864, and the Prize Courts Act, 1894. When in the
winter of 1902-1903 the British Government, acting in
conjunction with that of Germany, blockaded the ports
of Venezuela, in order to enforce the claims of British
subjects, and obtain reparation for injuries to British
shipping, quite a number of Venezuelan vessels were cap-
tured and taken to Port of Spain, Trinidad, under the
provisions of these statutes, and proceedings in prize
were begun; but the vessels were all restored before
condemnation, it having been decided to settle the
dispute by arbitration.'
During the Parliamentary session of 1905 a bill was
introduced "to consolidate, with amendments, the enact-
ments relating to naval prize of war." This bill was not
passed. but the mere fact that it was considered indicates
an intention to maintain the prize system as a permanent
feature of British law. The principal points of difference
between the British prize law and what was until recently
the American law on the subject are, first, that under the
former prize bounty depends on a special grant from the
Crown in any war, and that it applies to the capture of
an enemy's ships of war as well as to their destruction,
the rate being five pounds for each person on board such
a ship at the beginning of the engagement; secondly, that
all goods on land belonging to the enemy's government or
to a public trading company. of the enemy, exercising
powers of government, may be condemned as prize, when
captured either by a naval force or by naval and military
forces acting together; and thirdly, that in all captures
made by a joint naval and military force, both branches
of the service share in the prize money. Under the bill
above mentioned, an enemy's ships of war were apparently
* The costs incurred in these cases, all of which were ultimately paid
by the British Government, amounted to quite a little sum. The Sher-
iff of Trinidad, who had the custody of all the vessels, told the writer
that his own fees came to about ,iooo.
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no longer-to be condemned as prize, and prize bounty was
to be the only reward for their capture. This would
be a very reasonable change in the law, since a modern
ship of war is of no commercial use whatever, and the
Government would be the only purchaser at a sale under
a decree of condemnation. The decree and the sale
would therefore be alike superfluous, and it would be much
simpler to dispense with them altogether, giving instead
a direct reward for the capture, and allowing the Govern-
ment to retain the captured vessel for its own use. Such
was in fact the law in this country under the Act of
March 2, 1799, section 5.'
At the Congress of Lawyers and Jurists at St. Louis,
fil 1904, the exemption of non-contraband private prop-
erty from capture on the seas in time of war was dis-
cussed, but no resolutions were adopted. An Austrian
delegate and two Americans favored the exemption, while
an English and an American delegate opposed it. What
action the next Hague Conference will take in regard to
the matter remains to be seen, but in any event the aboli-
tion of prize rights by the United States was a long step
towards such exemption, in that it removed all personal
motive for making captures.
Charles Chauncey Binney
'3 Stats., 709.
